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Abstract 
Psychology and economics (the mixture of which is known as behavioral economics) are two 
fundamental disciplines underlying marketing. Various marketing studies document the non-
rational behavior of consumers, even though behavioral biases might not always be consistently 
termed or formally described. In this review, we identify empirical research that studies 
behavioral biases in marketing. We summarize the key findings according to three classes of 
deviations (i.e., non-standard preferences, non-standard beliefs, and non-standard decision-
making) and the marketing mix instruments (i.e., product, price, place, and promotion). We 
thereby introduce marketing researchers to the theoretical foundation of and terminology used in 
behavioral economics. For scholars from behavioral economics, we provide ready access to the 
rich empirical, applied marketing literature. We conclude with important managerial implications 
resulting from the behavioral biases of consumers, and we present avenues for future research. 
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1. Introduction 
For several decades, research in behavioral economics (i.e., the mixture of psychology and 
economics) has challenged the neoclassical paradigm by providing ample evidence that 
individual decisions are often systematically biased and do not confirm the forecasts of the 
standard theory (Thaler 2016). Such “behavioral biases” refer to deviations from the standard, 
neoclassical model that assumes that people are rational and have stable preferences, maximize 
expected utility (defined over final payoffs), exponentially discount future utility, process 
information like a Bayesian, and are purely self-interested (Rabin 2002). Behavioral scientists 
have been very successful in documenting those biases and in establishing new theories that 
formalize and explain the observed behavior, which deviates from the neoclassical model. 
Despite a growing interest in behavioral economics in recent years, there has been substantial 
resistance to the behavioral approach within economics until relatively recently (Thaler 2016). In 
business research, however, and particularly in the domains of finance1 and marketing, drawing 
on psychological theory has a long history and is deeply rooted in studying actual human 
behavior. In fact, precisely predicting human behavior to inform marketing decisions is one of the 
key objectives of marketing. However, even though economics and psychology are the two most 
influential disciplines underlying marketing (Ho, Lim, and Camerer 2006), no review has yet 
documented the empirical findings focusing solely on this field. Marketers in need of more theory 
could benefit from paying closer attention to behavioral economics, and economists could benefit 
from more closely following developments in marketing (e.g., developments that exploit the 
availability of rich consumer data documenting instances of non-rational behavior).2 
In this paper, we aim to bring together research from behavioral economics and marketing. The 
objective of this paper is to identify research in marketing that analyzes behavior deviating from 
neoclassical predictions and to map these findings onto a structure that involves elements of both 
economics and marketing. We provide an overview of behavioral biases studied in the latter and 
demonstrate that the major biases studied in economics have also been studied in marketing, even 
though they might not always be consistently termed or formally described. We provide detailed 
summaries of selected strong examples of biases from empirical marketing research, deriving 
                                                          
1 The field of behavioral finance can be considered as the most comprehensive combination of psychology and 
economics in a business discipline (DellaVigna 2009). A review documenting the empirical findings can be found in 
Barberis and Thaler (2003). 
2 http://evonomics.com/behavioraleconomics-neglect-marketing 
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implications for marketing research and practice. We focus on evidence from both the field and 
the lab. Note that, as opposed to the typically context-free lab experiments of economics, lab 
studies in marketing usually involve a particular marketing context and may therefore also 
provide interesting insights into how consumers and firms might behave under different 
circumstances. 
This paper contributes to marketing research and practice as well as to the field of behavioral 
economics. The contribution to research is twofold. First, the paper provides a structured review 
of the behavioral biases studied in marketing contexts and published in marketing outlets. 
Specific biases are analyzed for each of the elements of the marketing mix (i.e., product, price, 
place, promotion). Thus, this paper, unlike DellaVigna's (2009) paper, in which marketing studies 
were undersampled, applies a thematic focus. This approach introduces marketing researchers to 
the (more rigorous) terminology employed in the field of behavioral economics and may thereby 
help them to better navigate the extensive list of documented biases in this field. Regarding the 
field of behavioral economics, we aim to provide scholars with easy access to the rich marketing 
literature that contains applied empirical research. In addition, incorporating insights from other 
social sciences such as marketing gives researchers the opportunity to develop better models of 
economic behavior. 
More generally, researchers may benefit from this review by pursuing the proposed avenues for 
future research. With regard to marketing practice, this paper provides important implications for 
marketing managers by discussing how they could benefit from the non-rational behavior of their 
customers and how such behavior could change due to continuing technological advances. 
The paper’s structure reflects the goal of combining marketing and behavioral economics. We 
organize the paper according to the marketing mix instruments and categorize behavioral biases 
into three different classes following DellaVigna's (2009) review of deviations from rational 
behavior (non-standard preferences, non-standard beliefs, and non-standard decision making). 
The conceptual framework in the next section addresses the specific behavioral biases included in 
our review and briefly introduces the marketing mix instruments. Thereafter, we discuss selected 
papers that reflect the different “marketing instrument-bias” combinations, as well as managerial 
implications and avenues for future research. The paper concludes with general implications and 
a conclusion. 
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2. Conceptual Framework 
2.1. Behavioral Biases 
In this section, we introduce and briefly explain biases, which are widely covered in behavioral 
economics and that we discuss subsequently against the background of the marketing literature. 
We follow the structure of DellaVigna (2009) and distinguish deviations (i.e., behavioral biases) 
of individuals from the neoclassical standard model (Rabin 2002), where decision-makers are 
rational and have stable preferences, maximize expected utility (defined over final payoffs), 
exponentially discount future utility, process information like a Bayesian, and are purely self-
interested. In particular, we cover three classes of deviations from this model (DellaVigna 2009): 
non-standard preferences, non-standard beliefs, and non-standard decision-making (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Three classes of behavioral biases 
The first class of behavioral biases, non-standard preferences, refers to deviations from the 
assumptions of the standard model regarding the utility function (DellaVigna 2009; Rabin 2002). 
In the framework of intertemporal choice, the rational decision-maker has time-consistent 
preferences, which are modeled using exponential discounting of future utility. This implies that, 
for example, if someone chooses one apple today over two apples tomorrow, the same choice 
should hold at any other point in time, i.e., one apple in a year should be preferred to two apples 
in a year and one day. Thaler (1981) has provided experimental evidence that in such cases, 
preferences might, in fact, reverse so that two apples in a year and one day would be preferred to 
an apple in a year. This implies time-inconsistent preferences and discount factors, such that the 
outcomes of the near future are discounted more steeply than the outcomes of the distant future. 
Such discounting behavior is generally modeled by a (quasi-) hyperbolic discounting function 
(Laibson 1997; Loewenstein and Prelec 1992) and has been termed “present bias”, “hyperbolic 
discounting” or “declining impatience” (Urminsky and Zauberman 2016). Moreover, this concept 
can capture consumers’ problems of self-control. For example, suppose a person signs up for a 
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gym membership to force their future self to exercise more. As the future gets closer, e.g., the 
person must decide whether to exercise today, the future utility is discounted more steeply, so the 
person tends to procrastinate and postpone exercising (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provided evidence of the violation of one of the of the standard 
model’s core assumptions, namely that a rational agent maximizes a global utility function. This 
assumption entails that valuation is based on overall wealth. Instead, Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) propose that the utility function is defined relative to a reference point (reference 
dependence). The reference point defines what is considered a gain and what is considered a loss 
by the decision-maker. To capture diminishing sensitivity, the gain function is assumed to be 
concave, while the loss function is convex. Reference dependence has become one of the main 
building blocks of prospect theory; additionally, to accommodate the empirical evidence 
suggesting that people are more sensitive to losses than to gains (loss aversion), prospect theory 
assumes a steeper value function for losses. While prospect theory stems from evidence 
generated in the context of risky choice, these two key features – reference dependence and loss 
aversion – can explain, for example, the endowment effect, which refers to the finding that the 
mere possession of an object induces individuals to value it more than they did before possessing 
it. The endowment effect serves as a primary explanation for the observed asymmetry in 
exchanging goods with or without initial possession (Knetsch 1989), as well as for the so-called 
willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept asymmetry (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991; 
Knetsch 1989). In the context of risky choice, the third key assumption of prospect theory 
concerns the non-linear probability weighting function. This assumption aims to capture the early 
evidence by Allais (1953) that people tend to overweight small probabilities and underweight 
large probabilities (known as “Allais’s paradox” or “common ratio violation”). 
Furthermore, the standard model is built on the premise that the individual value function 
depends only on own payoffs and does not account for other-regarding preferences such as social 
preferences. Vast empirical evidence, however, suggests that people are not purely self-interested 
but rather involved in charitable giving (DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier 2012) and concerned 
with social welfare and fairness, e.g., in ultimatum or dictatorship games (Camerer and Thaler 
1995, 1995, 1995; Fehr and Gächter 2000, 2000). Also relevant in this context are social- and 
self-image effects, where rewards (whether material or image-related) for prosocial behavior can 
even be counterproductive (Benabou and Tirole 2006). 
6 
The second class of deviations, non-standard beliefs, builds on the empirical evidence suggesting 
that consumers form systematically incorrect beliefs and do not act as Bayesian information 
processors (DellaVigna 2009; Rabin 2002). Three major causes can come into play in this 
context. First, belief-based biases might be due to overconfidence, which might take different 
forms, including systematic over- or under-estimation of own capabilities and knowledge, as well 
as overprecision, i.e., the degree of certainty in one’s own beliefs, predictions and capabilities 
(Windschitl and O'Rourke 2015). Moreover, consumers tend to project their current preferences 
into future states, which is known as projection bias (Loewenstein 1996; Loewenstein, 
O'Donoghue, and Rabin 2003). This bias may come into play, for example, when ordering or 
buying food in a hungry state (Read and van Leeuwen 1998) or ordering winter clothing on an 
unusually cold day (Conlin, O'Donoghue, and Vogelsang 2007). Another source of belief-based 
biases is the misconception that small random samples are as representative as large samples, 
known as the law of small numbers (Tversky and Kahneman 1971). One such example is the so-
called gambler’s fallacy, that belief that, for example, after several occurrences of heads in a coin 
toss, tails will occur next to somehow restore the balance (Tversky 1974). A related 
misconception is the so-called “hot hand fallacy”, where subjects tend to believe that positive 
correlation exists in random processes, i.e., after a sequence of heads in a coin toss, another head 
is more likely to occur (Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky 1985). 
The third class of deviations, which DellaVigna (2009) refers to as non-standard decision-
making, addresses violations of the assumption of utility maximization. Rationality assumptions 
imply that choices are not affected by the environment/context or by the way the options are 
presented to the decision-maker. Research has shown, however, that the particular choice 
architecture does indeed affect the choices people make (Thaler, Sunstein, and Balz 2013). 
Specifically, we will discuss framing effects and local context effects. A number of experimental 
studies have shown the robustness of framing effects, i.e., when logically but not transparently 
equivalent problem formulation affects individuals’ choices (Rabin 1998). While in some cases, 
framing effects may arise due to a reference-dependent utility function, in other cases, such 
effects might affect preferences by making certain characteristics of options more salient. Putting 
aside the potential explanation for the existence of framing effects, they result in suboptimal 
choices from the perspective of the utility maximization assumption. Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 
(1998) further outline that framing might implicitly manipulate goals. For example, Meyerowitz 
and Chaiken (1987) show that women are more likely to conduct a breast self-examination when 
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the negative consequences are stressed. Moreover, in an intertemporal context, Loewenstein 
(1988) shows that, keeping the time interval constant, describing the same option as a delayed or 
expedited decision results in different discount rates, which violates the assumptions of 
rationality. This phenomenon is referred to as “temporal framing” or “delay-expedite 
asymmetry”.  Furthermore, choices might be affected by a particular composition of the choice 
set, resulting in non-utility-maximizing behavior (Simonson and Tversky 1992). These types of 
effects are accordingly named context effects and include compromise, attraction, and similarity 
effects, which violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives, regularity, and betweenness 
inequality assumptions of the standard model. The compromise effect (also known as 
“extremeness aversion”) describes a situation in which a product attracts a larger share in a 
setting where it is a middle rather than an extreme option (e.g., Simonson 1989; Simonson and 
Tversky 1992). The attraction effect (also known as “asymmetric dominance” or the “decoy 
effect”) implies that adding an asymmetrically dominated alternative to a choice set can lead to 
an increase in the probability of choosing the alternative that dominates it (Huber, Payne, and 
Puto 1982; Huber and Puto 1983). Tversky (1972) further distinguishes the similarity effect: An 
alternative loses more choice share to another more similar alternative. 
Furthermore, the standard model operates under the strict assumption that individuals consider all 
available information in their decision-making. This premise, however, has attracted criticism 
since Simon (1955), who suggested that individuals operate under bounded rationality and tend to 
simplify complex decisions. Limited attention, which might manifest as over- or underweighting, 
or completely ignoring some of the information available at no (or very low) cost, can result in 
suboptimal decisions from the perspective of the standard model. 
The normative theory further assumes that rational agents would be wary of the incentives that 
the provider of the information (e.g., firms, politicians, etc.) has and would account for this when 
making decisions. The literature on the effects of persuasion, however, shows that this is not 
necessarily the case, and quite often the beliefs of the information provider might, in fact, have 
excessive influence on individuals’ attitudes and behavior (DellaVigna 2009). As DeMarzo, 
Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) argue, this is an important bias, which offers a simple explanation 
for the existence of such phenomena as propaganda. Moreover, individuals’ attitudes and 
behavior might be subject to social pressure (DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier 2012), i.e., 
subject to explicit pressure from their reference group (e.g., peers, family, etc.). 
8 
In addition, the rational agent is considered to be deliberate and emotionless. Emotions, however, 
including visceral influences, e.g., hunger or thirst (Loewenstein 1996); anticipatory emotions, 
e.g., anxiety or fear; as well as anticipated emotions, e.g., regret (Loewenstein et al. 2001), have 
been shown to drive consumer behavior. 
While we largely follow DellaVigna (2009) in separating the three classes of deviations, it is 
important to note that quite often, these are interrelated. For example, persuasion might result in 
nonstandard decision-making through the induced biased beliefs. Furthermore, emotions may act 
as mediators of some of the other biases, e.g., self-control problems, social preferences 
(DellaVigna 2009) and attitudes towards risk (Loewenstein et al. 2001). 
2.2. Marketing Mix Instruments 
To provide marketing managers and researchers with a deeper understanding of the previously 
mentioned biases in a marketing context, we adopt an instrumental view. Marketing is an 
exchange relationship between customers and firms, where, in order to reach their goals, firms 
use the marketing mix instruments (Iacobucci 2017; Kotler and Keller 2012; Winer and Dhar 
2014). We structure our literature review based on these instruments and employ the classical 
definition of the 4Ps – product, price, place, and promotion – as suggested by Jerome McCarthy 
in 1960 (McCarthy and Perreault 2002) and covered in numerous marketing textbooks (Iacobucci 
2017; Kotler and Keller 2012; Winer and Dhar 2014). Product refers to any tangible or intangible 
item that satisfies particular consumer wants or needs. We consider such components as product 
variety (e.g., product line); product features, quality, and brand; as well as warranties and product 
returns. With regard to Price, i.e., the amount that a consumer pays for a product (including 
recurring payments, multi-part tariffs, and renting), we include, for example, list price and 
discounts. Under Place, we consider channels (online and offline) through which the products are 
marketed to consumers, (retailer) assortment decisions, location, and (in-store) placement. 
Promotion includes communication activities that aim at directly or indirectly informing, 
reminding as well as persuading consumers about the firm’s products (Kotler and Keller 2012). 
In our case, this includes advertising (at the point of sales (POS) and other media), direct 
marketing, and sales force. 
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3. Behavioral Biases in Marketing 
In this section, we present, for each marketing instrument, selected marketing papers that cover 
specific deviations from the standard model, grouped by the three classes of deviations from the 
neoclassical assumptions mentioned in the previous section. We selected these papers based on 
relevance, journal quality, citations, and recency. Table 1 gives an overview of the behavioral 









 Utilitarian vs. hedonic product choice 
 Durable product adoption 
Reference dependence  Extended warranties 
 Product insurance 
 Endowment effect 
 Return policy 
Social preferences  Fair trade labeling 
Non-standard 
beliefs 
Overconfidence  New product adoption 
Projection Bias  Remote purchases 
 Durable goods purchases 
Law of small numbers  Investment decisions 
Non-standard 
decision making 
Choice architecture/Framing  Package labeling 
 Delivery option 
 Local choice context 
 Preference for “all average” 
 Product line design 
Limited attention  Information overload 
 Consideration/choice set construction 
 Inattention to attributes 
 Left-digit bias 
Persuasion and social 
pressure 
 Peer effects 





 Quantity discounts 
 Consumption impulses 
Reference dependence  Reference prices 
 Price sensitivity 
 Price-quality heuristic 
Social preferences  Pay What You Want 
 Charitable giving 
 Price fairness 
Non-standard 
beliefs 
Overconfidence  Tariff choice 
Projection Bias  Usage prediction 
 Habit formation 
Law of small numbers  Store image 
Non-standard 
decision making 
Choice architecture/Framing  Price presentation 
 Price promotion 
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 Partitioned prices 
Limited attention  Price knowledge 
Persuasion and social 
pressure 
- 





 Impulse buying 
Reference dependence  Endowment effect 
 Need for touch 
Social preferences - 
Non-standard 
beliefs 
Overconfidence  Online search 
Projection Bias - 
Law of small numbers - 
Non-standard 
decision making 
Choice architecture/Framing  In-store marketing 
 Store layout 
 Recommendations 
 Search cost 
 Ranking effects 
 Channel effects 
Limited attention - 
Persuasion and social 
pressure 






 Sweepstakes and lotteries 
 Hedonic consumption 
Reference dependence  Probabilistic rewards 
 Frequency (loyalty) programs 
 Reward structure of sweepstakes 
Social preferences  Charitable giving 
 Direct marketing 
 Sales force incentives 
Non-standard 
beliefs 
Overconfidence  Probabilistic promotion 
 Delayed promotion 
 Redemption slippage 
Projection Bias - 
Law of small numbers  Casino gambling 
Non-standard 
decision-making 
Choice architecture/Framing  Redemption rates 
 Comparative advertising 
Limited attention  Feature advertisement 
Persuasion and social 
pressure 
 Exaggerated claims 
 Anecdotal claims 
Emotions - 




3.1.1. Product & Non-Standard Preferences 
Present-biased preferences are of particular interest in decisions involving (1) the choice between 
utilitarian vs. hedonic products in settings when a time lag exists between ordering and 
consumption of such products and (2) durable product adoption, where the adoption decision 
depends not only on the person’s static preferences but also on how and how much they discount 
future utility. In the first case, Milkman, Rogers, and Bazerman (2009; 2010) find that while 
products with more utilitarian or “should” characteristics are preferred at the time of ordering in 
advance, preferences switch to products with more hedonic or “want” characteristics at the time 
of consumption in the context of movies and groceries. Such preference reversals are consistent 
with present-bias preferences and can potentially be explained by self-control, as when ordering 
in advance, people might choose more “should” options to control their impulsive future selves. 
Similar to the example of cigarettes in the study by Wertenbroch (1998) discussed in 
section 3.2.1., such behavior is inconsistent with standard rationality assumptions of time 
consistent preferences. Regarding present-bias in the context of durable goods adoption, Dubé, 
Hitsch, and Jindal (2014) explore the susceptibility of consumers to this preference-based bias 
using the example of Blu-ray players. First, they develop a new experimental design that elicits 
product adoption choices conditional on expert predictions of future market conditions (e.g., 
prices), which enables the joint identification of utility and discount functions. Second, they test, 
in two choice experiments, different assumptions regarding the discounting behavior. In 
particular, they test (quasi-)hyperbolic discounting against the geometric discounting of the 
standard model, simultaneously accounting for heterogeneity in the discounting rates of 
consumers. They find that the dynamic choice model allowing for present-bias does fit the data 
slightly better in one experiment. However, the distribution of the individual estimates for the 
present-bias is concentrated at one, suggesting only limited empirical support for hyperbolic 
discounting. The small share of individuals who do exhibit present-bias, however, and 
subsequently act in contrast to the standard assumptions of time-consistent preferences, would be 
more prone to earlier product adoption. 
Regarding reference-dependent preferences, Wood (2001) provides experimental evidence that in 
remote purchase environments (e.g., catalog sales, online retailing), under a more flexible return 
policy (full refund vs. no refund for shipping costs), total deliberation time (over two stages of 
the decision-making, initial ordering and keep-or-return decision after delivery) decreases and 
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simultaneously increases the product quality perception. Moreover, they establish that 
respondents under a more flexible return policy are also less keen on continuing the search, 
which is counterintuitive. As the authors suggest, such a result can be explained by the 
endowment effect. After the initial purchase, the consumer is in possession of the product, which 
shifts the reference point so that returning the product would imply occurring losses. Wang 
(2009) provides further support for the endowment effect in product returns in the context of “in-
store” environments. Manipulating the return deadline, the author finds that more flexible 
policies increase the net purchase rate. Flexible return policies induce people to put less thought 
into the buying (ordering) decision, as returning the product is easy, and therefore a more 
informed decision can be made later at the keep-or-return stage. Thus, in the absence of the 
endowment effect (i.e., under the standard model), one would expect an increase in deliberation 
time at the keep-or-return stage. In the presence of the endowment effect, however, due to mere 
possession, the valuation of the product seems to be higher, and deliberation at the keep-and-
return stage does not increase. 
Furthermore, in practice, we can observe that many consumers pay high premia for extended 
product warranties and other types of insurance, which would imply an unrealistically high 
degree of risk aversion. However, in describing such behavior, it is not clear what the primary 
driver of risk attitude is: risk aversion (diminishing returns in utility), loss aversion (which 
requires a reference-dependent utility function), or nonlinear probability weighting. Jindal (2015), 
for example, finds that loss aversion is the most important of the three abovementioned drivers in 
the context of extended warranty choices for washing machines. This finding is robust across two 
different mechanisms, simultaneous choice – when the product and warranty choice is a joint 
decision – as well as sequential choice – when consumers first decide whether to buy the product 
and then decide whether to purchase an extended warranty. From a firm’s point of view, this is a 
problem of bundling or unbundling the product and the warranty. The author uses a flexible 
modeling approach that distinguishes among all three potential drivers of risk attitudes and 
simultaneously accounts for heterogeneity in all model components. Furthermore, an innovative 
survey design is used to attenuate possible belief-based biases: respondents choose products and 
warranties under given failure probabilities. Jindal (2015) shows in simulations (based on the 
estimated models) that not accounting for risk aversion, loss aversion, and nonlinear probability 
weighting leads to roughly 16-20% lower optimal prices and, consequently, reduced profits for 
manufacturers. 
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Lastly, in the context of products, social preferences might come into play for product features 
such as fair trade labels. Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Sequeira (2015) provide more recent empirical 
evidence from a large-scale field experiment in which sales for (whole and ground) coffee 
increased by approximately 8% when the product carried a fair trade label. A fair trade label does 
not improve the quality of the product itself (i.e., there is no difference in taste for a fair trade 
food product compared to the same one without a label), yet there is ample empirical evidence 
from surveys that consumers are willing to pay more for socially responsible products (see Tully 
and Winer 2014for a meta study). This implies that consumers perceive higher utility for products 
with fair trade labels because they care about others (i.e., the workers), indicating social 
preferences that would not matter in the standard model. 
3.1.2. Product & Non-standard Beliefs 
Overconfidence can play a crucial role in product choice, particularly for new product adoption. 
Here, consumers need to predict and anticipate the utility of new products that have features they 
can hardly evaluate without experiencing them (Guo 2006). Consumers can be overly optimistic 
regarding the future usefulness of capabilities and then fail to use the features they paid for. 
Meyer, Zhao, and Han (2008) provide empirical evidence from experiments on such valuation-
usage disparity: respondents are willing to pay for a new set of controls in a computer game, but 
after ownership, usage is rather limited. While hyperbolic discounting can potentially explain this 
phenomenon, as individuals procrastinate learning the new capabilities of the product, belief-
based biases such as overoptimism might act as a further driver. The latter is a bias closely 
related to overconfidence, where decision-makers are overly positive about the prospect of 
something desirable. In this particular context, the valuation-usage disparity can be a result of 
individuals being overoptimistic about the likely performance value of the new set of controls.  
The product choices of consumers might also be influenced by projection bias. This is especially 
true for goods that are purchased for later consumption (e.g., catalog/internet purchases) or 
durable goods (Conlin, O'Donoghue, and Vogelsang 2007). Here, consumers have to forecast 
how much utility they will derive in the future, and this carries the risk that they only project their 
current preferences into the future. Busse et al. (2015) analyze automobile purchases and 
investigate whether specific product choices are affected by belief-based biases, such as the 
projection bias. Indeed, they find that the weather has an impact and that convertibles (four-
wheel-drive cars) have higher sales if the weather is warm (cold) at the time of purchase. Busse et 
14 
al. (2012) also report similar findings for the housing market, where consumers tend to buy 
houses with swimming pools in the case of warm weather at the time of purchase. 
Next to projection bias, two product-related belief-based biases, which stem from the law of 
small numbers, are the gambler’s fallacy and the hot hand myth. Both biases are well documented 
in marketing, particularly in the context of trading decisions of consumers at the stock market. 
Johnson, Tellis, and Macinnis (2005) conduct an experiment where respondents have to choose 
one out of two products (i.e., stock) which differ in their past performance. Under the standard 
model, past random events should not have an influence on current decisions. However, which 
bias (hot hand vs. gambler’s fallacy) dominates depends on whether one wants to buy or sell a 
stock and on the length of the trend in the available information. In the buying condition, the hot 
hand fallacy dominates (“buy a winner”) as the length of the trend increases. Only a minor share 
of respondents would “buy a loser,” hoping the trend will reverse. However, in the selling 
condition, the picture is less clear. A considerable share of respondents would sell a winning 
stock because they anticipate that the trend will reverse. This effect is strongest for a trend of 
medium length. 
3.1.3. Product & Non-Standard Decision-Making 
Product choices might be affected by the framing of attribute information. Ample evidence 
suggests that positive vs. negative frames affect choices. Hence, regarding product attribute 
information, it might matter how certain information is described, e.g., on a package. Levin and 
Gaeth (1988) find that describing ground beef as “75% lean” vs. “25% fat” increases the 
favorability of a consumer’s evaluation of the product. This contradicts standard rational 
decision-making, as both descriptions report exactly the same information, only differently. A 
rational consumer would not have been susceptible to such framing effects and would have 
evaluated the products under each description as equally favorable.  
Temporal framing (i.e., delay-expedite asymmetry) is of particular interest in marketing in the 
context of remote purchase environments. For example, online retailers offer different delivery 
options for the same product (e.g., same-day delivery, next-day delivery, etc.). Loewenstein 
(1988) provides evidence that consumers have overall higher discount rates when delaying an 
outcome rather than expediting it, a robust deviation from a normative discounting utility model. 
Malkoc and Zauberman (2006) provide experimental evidence of this effect in a marketing 
context that mimics DVD purchases on Amazon. In particular, they show that in a delay frame, 
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consumers require higher compensation (e.g., larger price discounts) to wait longer (e.g., 
choosing a later date over same-day delivery) compared to the price they are willing to pay for 
getting the product earlier (expedite frame). Furthermore, they find that the pattern of discounting 
can differ depending on the temporal frame, such that consumers demonstrate the greater extent 
of present-bias (i.e., a steeper discounting) when delaying the delivery compared to expediting it. 
Choosing a product from a set of alternatives implies trading off different attributes of the 
products (e.g., quality, brand, packaging, price, etc.). In such situations, consumers might be 
susceptible to context effects, resulting in choices that are not consistent with standard decision-
making. Many studies in the marketing literature have shown the robustness of these phenomena 
across a wide range of product categories, particularly in settings involving the choice between 
three alternatives varying on two attributes (e.g., Dhar, Nowlis, and Sherman 2000; Dhar and 
Simonson 2003; Simonson 1989). For example, Kivetz, Netzer, and Srinivasan (2004) find 
empirical evidence for the compromise effect. In particular, they analyze consumer choices in 
two product categories, which are described on two attributes: portable PCs varying in speed and 
memory as well as speakers varying in power and price. They find that consumers do indeed 
prefer the middle option, which provides a good trade-off on both dimensions. Furthermore, 
testing different models that allow capturing the compromise effect, they show that such models, 
in general, provide a better fit and higher predictive validity compared to the standard model 
operating under rationality assumptions. However, in the particular applications they use, it is 
difficult to determine the exact mechanism creating the compromise effect. 
Rooderkerk, van Heerde, and Bijmolt (2011) analyze the choice of digital cameras, which are 
described using their picture quality (in megapixels) and optical zoom. Following Tversky and 
Simonson (1993), they propose an approach that accommodates not only the compromise effect 
but all three context effects. In particular, they suggest separating the total utility into context-
independent and -dependent parts, modeling the latter as a linear combination of compromise, 
attraction, and similarity effects. This allows all three effects to co-occur, which is indeed the 
case in their empirical application. The model outperforms the traditional random utility model. 
Most importantly, the authors demonstrate that even after accounting for preference 
heterogeneity, context effects still prevail, excluding preference heterogeneity as a possible 
explanation of the observed context effects on the aggregate level, as described in the literature. 
The specific drivers and causes of context effects still require further investigation. For example, 
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Kivetz, Netzer, and Srinivasan (2004) suggest that complexity can potentially attenuate the 
magnitude of the compromise effect, and Dhar and Simonson (2003) outline a no-choice option 
(i.e., whether the consumer is forced to choose or not) as a potential moderator of context effects. 
The consequences of limited attention have also been given a rather prominent position in the 
marketing literature. Substantial evidence suggests that increasing the number of alternatives or 
attributes of the choice setting leads to information overload (Malhotra 1982), which can prompt 
decision-makers to apply heuristic strategies and ignore information (Payne et al. 1992). This, in 
turn, results in suboptimal choices from the standpoint of the standard model. In particular, 
consumers may limit their attention to a subset of alternatives or attributes. For example, in the 
context of powder detergent brand choice, Bronnenberg and Vanhonacker (1996) show that 62% 
of loyal consumers consider only one brand, and 60% of more sensitive consumers consider 2-3 
brands in their choice set. Gilbride, Allenby, and Brazell (2006) focus on inattention to attributes 
and, based on a choice experiment, provide evidence that consumers consider only approximately 
46% of attributes in their decision-making. Such results contradict standard decision-making, as 
inattention to attributes or alternatives results in non-compensatory decision rules. From the 
modeling perspective, not accounting for the fact that individuals might consider only subsets of 
attributes or alternatives in their decision-making results in biased estimates and false insights 
derived from the estimated parameters, such as willingness-to-pay measures or the relative 
importance of attributes (Gilbride, Allenby, and Brazell 2006), as well as competitive dynamics 
and substitution of brands (Bronnenberg and Vanhonacker 1996). To better understand the 
underlying mechanisms of inattention, it is important to relate inattention to potential drivers, 
such as complexity measures (Swait, Popa, and Wang 2016). 
Inattention can further result in incomplete processing of the information provided by a specific 
attribute. One of the main examples is the left-digit bias – the tendency to ignore the rightmost 
digits of numeric information. This is relevant in the context of product features, which are 
described quantitatively (e.g., power, weight, and price; see Koschate-Fischer and Wüllner 
(2016) for an overview). Lacetera, Pope, and Sydnor (2012) find strong evidence of left-digit bias 
in the processing of the mileage of used cars, which results in discontinuity of sales prices. This is 
a surprising result, as buying a used car is still costly, and the mileage itself is an important and 
readily available piece of information when making a decision. 
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The marketing literature has also contributed to the research on social influence or peer effects. 
For example, Narayan, Rao, and Saunders (2011) conduct an experiment with MBA students in 
which they analyze the choices in E-book readers. In the first stage, the students participate in a 
typical discrete choice experiment stating their preferred products. In the second stage, the 
experiment is repeated, but the respondents are informed about the choices of their peers during 
stage one. The authors observe that the choices change in the second round, so that strong brands 
obtain an even larger choice share, while the weak brands’ choice share decreases. Such behavior 
is strongly consistent with peer effects, as respondents tend to conform with the preferences of 
their respective reference group, resulting in non-utility-maximizing behavior. However, the 
authors find that the number of influencers has a positive but diminishing moderating effect on 
peer influence. 
Lastly, emotions have also been shown to affect the product choice decisions of consumers. 
Brands are valuable intangible assets of firms that strongly influence consumer choice and lead to 
vertical product differentiation (Keller and Lehmann 2006). However, emotions, and particularly 
negative emotions, play a significant role in the relationship of consumers with brands. Romani, 
Grappi, and Dalli (2012) develop and test a new scale with six distinct brand-related emotions 
(i.e., anger, discontent, dislike, embarrassment, sadness, and worry). Their study shows that 
negative emotions towards a brand also influence consumer decision-making. Consumers who 
feel, e.g., dislike, anger, or sadness towards a brand, have a higher likelihood of complaining 
about the brand, engaging in negative word of mouth about the brand, and switching to a 
competing brand. Under rationality assumptions, consumer behavior, by definition, should not be 
influenced by general or brand-related emotions. Therefore, such findings argue for 
“irrationality” in a narrowly defined sense. 
3.2. Price 
3.2.1. Price & Non-standard Preferences 
Using multiple methods and data sources, Wertenbroch (1998) studies consumption self-control 
in the context of relative “vice” (i.e., regular) and “virtue” (e.g., reduced fat, calorie, or caffeine) 
goods. He shows that to control their unwanted consumption impulses, consumers voluntarily 
and strategically ration the quantities of goods they purchase; thus, they buy smaller quantities at 
a higher per-unit price. For example, regular smokers often buy their cigarettes by the pack, 
although they could afford to buy 10-pack cartons. In this way, they give up per-unit savings 
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from quantity discounts and increase their transaction costs to make smoking overly costly for 
themselves. Such behavior might seem intuitive but is inconsistent with the time consistency of 
preferences assumed by the standard model. As a consequence, vice consumers are less likely 
than virtue consumers to buy larger quantities in response to unit price reductions such as 
quantity discounts. 
Reference dependence in the context of pricing is a widely researched area in the marketing 
literature, which we illustrate through examples from reference price theory, loss aversion, and 
the price-quality heuristic. Various studies in the pricing literature use prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979), especially its features of reference dependence and loss aversion, 
as a conceptual framework for their analyses; these studies use the applications and boundaries of 
prospect theory to answer marketing research questions. One of the most prevalent phenomena 
studied in this context is reference price theory. Kalyanaram and Winer (1995) establish three 
generalizations from reference price research that are drawn from broad empirical research in 
marketing. The first and the third are more general in that they also apply to other contexts of 
reference dependence, whereas the second generalization is specific to pricing research. The first 
generalization states that reference prices have a consistent and significant impact on consumer 
demand. Typically, the reference price is the “perceived” or expected price. The third 
generalization states that consumers react differently to price increases and decreases relative to 
the reference price, namely they react more strongly to price increases (Kalyanaram and Winer 
1995). In general, consumers perceive prices above the reference price as losses and prices below 
the reference price as gains. Finally, the second generalization implies that “internal” reference 
prices use past prices as part of the consumer’s information set. This generalization aims at the 
question of how reference prices are formed. There is convincing empirical evidence that past 
prices play an important role in the reference price formation process. For a more comprehensive 
assessment of reference price research, see also Mazumdar, Raj, and Sinha (2005). In general, 
reference price theory clearly deviates from the standard model, in which agents make decisions 
based on actual prices and income. Conversely, reference price theory assumes that consumers 
also base their decisions on perceived prices – namely the reference price, which serves as an 
internal standard against which observed prices are compared. 
Returning to loss aversion, early research found loss aversion to be ubiquitous, whereas more 
recent research stresses the importance of also considering its boundaries and attenuations (e.g., 
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Novemsky and Kahneman 2005). For example, Bell and Lattin (2000) show that loss aversion is 
not a universal phenomenon but that accounting for price-response heterogeneity leads to lower 
and frequently non-significant estimates of loss aversion, at least in the context of frequently 
purchased grocery products. They argue that the kinked value function, as implied by loss 
aversion, is confounded with the slopes of the response curves across consumer segments with 
different price responsiveness. A more price sensitive consumer is assumed to have a lower 
reference point and thereby encounters more prices above his reference point (i.e., the response 
curve is steeper for losses). Analogously, less price-sensitive consumers have less-steep curves in 
the domain of gains. Therefore, cross-sectional estimates of loss aversion that do not account for 
heterogeneity in price responsiveness will be biased upwards. 
Finally, reference dependence can also help explain the so-called “price-quality” heuristic, which 
represents the fact that consumers often use price as a proxy for quality, resulting in a positive 
correlation between price and product liking. According to (Gneezy, Gneezy, and Lauga 2014), 
expectations are an important driver of the price-quality relationship. High prices increase 
expectations, which serve as a reference point against which people evaluate their consumption 
experience. If the consumption experience meets or exceeds this reference point, the traditional 
price-quality effect is observed. However, when the price is high and quality is relatively low, the 
product falls short of the consumer’s reference point, and the price-quality relationship is 
reversed. As a result, consumers evaluate a low-quality product with a high price more negatively 
than a low-quality product with a low price. 
Pay What You Want (PWYW) is a pricing mechanism in which consumers make voluntary 
payments for a good or service for private as well as public consumption (Spann et al. 2017). 
Although a niche mechanism, many examples of sellers applying PWYW can be found in various 
industries, such as the music industry, gastronomy, or entertainment (Krämer et al. 2017). Much 
research focuses on the behavioral drivers that influence payments. Schmidt, Spann, and 
Zeithammer (2014) show that outcome-based social preferences and strategic considerations to 
keep a seller in the market can explain why and how much buyers voluntarily pay to a PWYW 
seller. This behavior clearly deviates from the standard model, as purely self-interested and 
myopic consumers, for whom utility only depends on their own payoff, would simply pay 
nothing (DellaVigna 2009). Jung et al. (2017) extend the phenomenon of voluntary payments to 
shared social responsibility, i.e., whether a charitable contribution is made with a purchase. Their 
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study shows that consumers are sensitive to whether any part of their payment goes to charity but 
largely insensitive to the amount of that payment. 
With regard to perceived price unfairness, Campbell (1999) shows that consumers are less likely 
to conduct business with a firm that is perceived to have established unfair prices. In terms of 
price increases, the study demonstrates that consumers’ inferred motive for the price increase and 
the relative profit to be made by the firm because of the increase both affect consumers’ 
perceived price fairness. For example, when participants concluded that a firm had a negative 
motive (e.g., increasing profits) for the price increase, the increase was perceived as less fair than 
when the firm had a positive motive (e.g., donating additional profits to charity). Moreover, firm 
reputation moderates the effect of inferred relative profit on inferred motive. Consumers are more 
willing to give a firm with a good reputation the benefit of the doubt when speculating about the 
inferred motive for the price increase. This phenomenon again contradicts standard economic 
theory, as the motives behind firms’ pricing strategies should not affect their customers’ decision-
making. However, Campbell’s (1999) study shows that consumers also take the interest of the 
firm into account, consistent with the example of customer-driven pricing mechanisms discussed 
above. 
3.2.2. Price & Non-standard Beliefs 
Focusing on the internet service industry, Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) find that consumers make 
“mistakes” in tariff choice in that they often do not pick the tariff that is financially optimal for 
them. The authors show that many consumers pick the flat-rate tariff even when it is not the least 
costly choice (i.e., “flat-rate bias”), and a smaller share of consumers picks the pay-per-use tariff, 
although they would save money under the flat-rate tariff (i.e., “pay-per-use bias”). With regard 
to the causes of these biases, the study shows that overestimation of usage leads to a flat-rate bias 
and that underestimation of usage leads to a pay-per-use bias. In addition, they show that 
consumers seem to derive additional benefits from the flat-rate option, and these benefits also 
influence tariff choice. The so-called insurance effect (reliability of the billing rate) and the taxi 
meter effect (the joy and independence of using a flat-rate) are also correlated with the flat-rate 
bias. Although not explicitly mentioned in the study, overconfidence is a leading candidate 
explanation for mistakes being made in tariff choice, as proposed by other related studies 
(DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006; Grubb 2012). More specifically, it is likely that 
overconfident consumers overestimate their ability to predict their future demand and its 
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precision; thus, they misestimate their demand, which leads to mistakes in tariff choice. Recall 
that under the assumptions of the standard model, consumers should form rational expectations, 
and these expectations should be valid, on average. 
Returning to the previous example of self-control in the context of cigarette consumption, we 
discussed how overconfident consumers might overestimate their ability to forecast their future 
demand and thereby misestimate it. While they might underestimate their demand for vice goods, 
they might overestimate their demand for virtue goods. Acland and Levy (2015) study such a 
virtue good by analyzing, in a field experiment, the influence of incentive intervention on gym 
attendance. They incentivized the treatment group with $100 if they visited the gym twice a week 
during one month. In addition, they provided subjects with coupons that subsidized each gym 
visit during an indicated week. Their results show that consumers overpredict future attendance, 
which they attribute to consumers having a naïve present bias, such that consumers fail to predict 
the future impact of immediate gratification in the form of a price discount on gym attendance. In 
addition, the study finds an increase in the treated gym members’ attendance after the treatment 
phase (although only for a short period of time), which they attribute to habit formation. 
Participants, however, did not predict such an increase in gym attendance after the treatment 
phase. The authors’ explanation for this phenomenon is projection bias with regard to habit 
formation, as participants did not expect the increased attendance in the treatment phase to result 
in a habit that would also increase their attendance in the immediate post-treatment period. 
Instead, participants exhibited incorrect beliefs in line with the projection bias, as they expected 
their future preferences regarding gym attendance to remain the same as the present ones. 
Next to overconfidence and projection bias, the law of small numbers is documented in 
marketing research. For example, it could be shown that consumers seem to generalize from a 
small sample of advertised prices to the overall store price image (Cox and Cox 1990). Using an 
experiment, the authors analyze the effect of different versions of retail advertisements – with 
differing price and product representations – on the perceived store’s overall price level. The 
results show that when advertised prices are displayed as reductions from a previous higher price, 
consumers perceive the store to have overall lower prices. Thus, consumers generalize from a 
small and possibly highly selective sample of advertised reference prices to make inferences 
about the population of prices in the entire store. This illustrates the law of small numbers, as 
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information on a small sample is overweighed, and consequently, consumers’ decisions are likely 
to be biased. 
3.2.3. Price & Non-standard Decision-Making 
Price framing is a widely researched area in the marketing literature. Many features of how a 
price is communicated to consumers – for example, whether it is accompanied by a reference 
price – significantly influence price perceptions. In their meta-analysis, Krishna et al. (2002) 
focus on experimental literature dealing with the impact of price presentation on perceived 
savings. Perceived savings is considered the main dependent variable because it is the most 
common method of measuring the reaction to price promotions (Krishna et al. 2002). Looking at 
how different price promotion characteristics affect perceived savings, it was shown that higher 
values for both percentage of savings and absolute savings increase perceived savings, but 
percentage has a larger effect. This contradicts utility theory, which suggests that only the 
absolute dollar amount should have an effect on the evaluation of a price promotion. The effect of 
price promotion percentage is moderated by store type, that is, whether the promotion is by a 
department store, whether the regular price is used as an external reference price, and by tensile 
claims (e.g., savings of __% and more). Moreover, price presentation effects also play an 
important role when measuring the effect on perceived savings. For example, large effects within 
this category are caused by whether a sale was announced, the promotion plausibility, tensile 
claims, within-store frames (e.g., our current price is x, our regular price is y), and external 
reference prices. To give an example, tensile claims are perceived as lower savings than other 
non-tensile (objective) claims (e.g., savings given as a coupon), as the low end of the price 
promotion is highlighted in tensile claims. Finally, situational effects seem to be less important 
than price promotion characteristics and price presentation effects in terms of effect size, but 
many of these effects are still very important for marketing managers. Brand type, store type, and 
type of good all have significant effects on perceived savings. With regard to store type, it was 
shown that sales in discount stores and department stores are perceived to be of lower value than 
sales in specialty stores, in supermarkets, and when the type of store was not mentioned (Krishna 
et al. 2002). All these examples clearly highlight that the context and the framing of a situation 
matter strongly for price presentation, promotions, and strategy. Prices framed differently were 
shown to have different effects on perceived savings or attitudes towards the price promotion or 
product. 
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Another example of framing that influences consumers’ reactions to prices is partitioned prices – 
i.e., dividing a product’s price into two mandatory parts, such as the base price of the product and 
a surcharge, for example, the shipping cost (Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson 1998). Using 
experiments, the authors show that partitioned prices tend to decrease consumers’ recalled total 
costs and to increase consumers’ product demand in comparison with all-inclusive or combined 
prices. In line with the results above, the study also shows that the way in which the surcharge is 
presented also influences the reaction to partitioned prices. This is an indication of irrational 
behavior, as consumers should not differ in their demand depending on how the price is 
presented, as total costs remain the same.  
Moving to limited attention, Dickson and Sawyer (1990) study price knowledge within the 
context of behavioral pricing in marketing. In their study, the authors employed personnel with 
clipboards who observed and interviewed shoppers in supermarkets. They observed shoppers at 
the point-of-sale and asked them questions regarding their price knowledge of items (e.g., the 
selling price or whether a product was on sale or not) that the shoppers had, just a moment 
before, placed in their shopping carts. The results show that only slightly more than half of the 
shoppers checked the price of the chosen item, and only slightly more than 20% also stated that 
they had checked the price of a competitor brand. Despite being interviewed directly after 
selecting the item, price recall accuracy was very low, as 21.1% of shoppers did not even give a 
price estimate, and only 47.1% of shoppers were able to report the exact correct price. These 
findings thus reveal that consumers do not make decisions using all the available (price) 
information there is, as predicted by the standard model, but pay only limited attention to price. 
Finally, emotions were shown to influence decision-making in a pricing context. In order to 
illustrate this, Ding et al. (2005) analyzed emotions evoked in a Priceline-like reverse auction; 
specifically, they evoked the excitement of winning and the frustration of losing. Their study 
shows that the classic economic model, which predicts static bidding behavior in such a setting, 
did not capture the empirical bidding behavior, as bidders usually changed their bids after each 
round. Furthermore, the study shows that emotions strongly influence the bidding process and 
that emotions dynamically change as a function of the outcome of the previous bid. Thus, a 
bidder revises the bid every time his emotional state changes due to the outcome of the previous 




3.3.1. Place & Non-standard Preferences 
In terms of self-control and place, we discuss self-control as a driver of impulse buying, as earlier 
studies have already shown that impulse buying is driven by – among other factors – distribution 
characteristics, such as the number of store outlets or prominent store displays (Stern 1962). With 
the diffusion of (additional) online channels, opportunities for impulse buying have increased, 
making it even more important to better understand the situational factors driving impulse buying 
(Vohs and Faber 2007). For example, the increased use of mobile devices (StatCounter 2016), 
which consumers typically carry around with them all day, offers marketers additional 
opportunities to increase impulse buying through in-app advertisements or mobile coupons. In 
their study, Vohs and Faber (2007) analyze how the depletion of resources that govern self-
control affects impulse buying. Using three experiments, they manipulate self-regulatory 
resources and measure the effect on impulse buying. The results of the experiments show that 
participants whose resources were depleted 1) reported a higher willingness to pay for a series of 
items they were shown, 2) spent more time in a mock unanticipated buying situation, and 3) 
actually did spend more money in real purchase situations compared to the control group. Thus, 
this study illustrates how self-control problems can affect impulse buying behavior. 
As computer usage has shifted from desktop computers to mobile phones and tablets 
(StatCounter 2016), interfaces have shifted towards touchpads and touchscreens (Brasel and Gips 
2014). As consumers increase their e-commerce visits on touch devices, it is important to 
understand what impact touch has on consumer behavior. For example, Brasel and Gips’ (2014) 
study analyzes the relationship between different touch interfaces and the endowment effect. The 
results from two online shopping scenarios show that touchscreens, as opposed to touchpads and 
mice, generate stronger psychological ownership, which increases the endowment effect and the 
willingness to accept for selected products. This behavior deviates from the standard model, as 
simply a change in the interface leads to an asymmetry in willingness to accept. The size of the 
endowment effects generated with different interfaces rival those conducted with real products, 
which shows that the endowment effect also occurs in online settings. 
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3.3.2. Place & Non-standard Beliefs 
In this section, we combine findings from different studies to illustrate that when considered 
together, the findings indicate irrational consumer behavior. Because the Internet lowers search 
costs, one would assume that as a result, consumers are searching more online (Brynjolfsson and 
Smith 2000). However, as Johnson et al. (2004) show, consumers’ searching on the Internet is 
relatively limited. The authors compare searches on competing e-commerce sites for three 
different product categories. On average, households only visit 1.2 book sites, 1.3 CD sites, and 
1.8 travel sites during one month, reflecting very low levels of searching over all categories. 
Households with higher shopping activity tend to visit more sites, however, experience does not 
seem to increase the number of sites visited. There are no time-varying effects for books and 
CDs. Because travel constitutes a high-expenditure product, one would expect that experience 
might lead to more searching, but instead, search propensity slightly decreases over time. Such 
limited searching cannot be explained by efficient markets, as prices across these categories are 
significantly dispersed (Clemons, Hann, and Hitt 2002). Price observations for books and CDs 
from a similar study reveal that Internet retailer prices vary, on average, by 33% for books and 
25% for CDs (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000). Price differences are also apparent when comparing 
online and offline channels, as the authors find that prices on the Internet are 9-16% lower than 
prices in conventional stores (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000). Although not explicitly mentioned 
in these studies, a likely explanation for too little searching is overconfidence. Consumers might 
overestimate the precision of their own information regarding prices and thereby underestimate 
the differences that might exist across different e-commerce sites, across online and offline 
channels, or over time. As a result, overconfident consumers tend to search too little. 
3.3.3. Place & Non-standard Decision-Making 
In a study on in-store marketing, Hui et al. (2013) analyze in-store travel distance and find that it 
affects unplanned spending. More specifically, they show how two different shopper marketing 
strategies – product category relocation and mobile coupons – can be used to increase in-store 
travel distance and thereby unplanned spending, as consumers are exposed to more in-store 
stimuli. Using simulations, they suggest that the relocation of three product categories (i.e., a 
form of physical framing) can increase unplanned spending by 7.2%. However, promoting three 
product categories via mobile coupons may increase unplanned spending by as much as 16.1% 
compared with the benchmark strategy of relocating product categories. As the two strategies are 
not mutually exclusive, the authors propose that both can be used simultaneously. The 
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effectiveness of increasing travel distance through mobile coupons, and thereby increasing 
unplanned spending, is also confirmed by a follow-up field experiment. Here, the authors 
manipulate the proximity of the couponed category to the planned path (near vs. far), and they 
also manipulate the coupon amount. Again, the idea is that a coupon for an unplanned category 
that is farther away exposes the consumer to more in-store stimuli and thereby might lead to more 
unplanned buying. These predictions were confirmed, as the average amount in the far coupon 
group was much higher ($21.29) than in the near coupon group ($13.83). These results indicate 
that manipulations of the in-store travel distance clearly influence consumer behavior. One would 
expect rational agents not to deviate from their planned purchase behavior, regardless of the path 
they take in the store. However, as the study showed, the indirect manipulation of in-store travel 
distance led to more unplanned buying. 
Whereas the previous study dealt with framing in a conventional store setting, the following 
study by Diehl (2005) shows how framing can have an effect on consumer behavior in the 
context of searching in online shopping. Whereas online environments are often assumed to offer 
lower search costs and the advantage of screening and sorting products (e.g., Alba et al. 1997), 
Diehl's (2005) study shows that the combination of orderings with lower search costs or more 
recommendations can lead to lower choice quality in terms of lower average quality of 
considered options and more attention to mediocre rather than better options from the considered 
set. Typically, screening tools in e-commerce sort through many options and recommend to 
consumers a list of products that fit a consumer’s utility function best, ordered from best to worst. 
Because the best options are already listed at the top, additional search is unlikely to expose 
consumers to better options, as opposed to unordered environments. Thus, more searching in 
ordered environments exposes consumers to a lower average quality of inspected options, which 
can tempt consumers to choose lower-quality options. This aspect limits the benefits of ordered 
environments. Counterintuitively, this tendency to make lower quality choices is amplified if 
search costs are low and consumers are very motivated to be accurate in their searches, as they 
are encouraged to consider a broader range of products. That study shows – though doing so is 
not its main goal – how the framing of products in an online setting, realized through the ordering 
of products, can influence consumer choice. The presentation of the seemingly best option 
according to the utility function at the top of an ordered environment results in worse choices. For 
a similar study analyzing product search with recommendations, see also Dellaert and Häubl 
(2012). 
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Another question that arises when considering search in an online setting is how Internet 
browsing behavior differs between different online channels, i.e., personal computers and mobile 
phones. Ghose, Goldfarb, and Han (2013) empirically analyze search costs and geographic 
proximity (i.e., distance to store) on the mobile Internet vs. the PC-based Internet. They use rank 
as a measure of search cost, as consumers exhibit more cognitive and potentially physical effort 
when scrolling down a long list. Higher ranking effects suggest that it is more valuable to be 
ranked at the top. They expect ranking effects to be higher on mobile phones due to the 
comparably higher amount of scrolling down required on a small screen. In addition, because it is 
easier for mobile than PC users to go to nearby stores, the authors assume geographic proximity 
to be more important on a mobile phone. These predictions are confirmed using data from a 
South Korean microblogging website. First, the negative relationship between the rank and 
clicking on a post is larger for mobile phones. Moving one position upwards in the ranks leads to 
a 25% increase in the probability of clicking on that post for PC users and an increase of 37% for 
mobile users. Thus, the study shows that ranking effects are higher on the mobile Internet. 
Second, in terms of distance effects, preferences for geographically proximate brand stores are 
higher for mobile users. A one-mile decrease in distance between a user and a brand leads to an 
increase in the probability of clicking on that brand post of 12% for PC users and 23% for mobile 
users, showing that distance is more important for mobile users. Overall, the study shows how the 
framing of the search situation through different devices can influence consumer behavior, 
assuming that the same information is available across devices. In this context, framing is 
accomplished by the different devices used for product search – mobile vs. PC. More specifically, 
this study shows how, when framed through a certain device, attention is focused on different 
aspects of the options. One would expect rational consumers not to differ in their choices simply 
because different distribution channels are being used. However, the study showed how different 
channels led to differences in clicking behavior.  
In this section, we have analyzed how framing can lead to non-standard decision-making. Next, 
we consider social pressure, more specifically social contagion and how it affects consumer 
behavior. Gardete (2015) studies social effects in the in-flight marketplace. This distribution 
channel is particularly suitable for the analysis of social effects, as the seating arrangements 
provide useful information on which passengers’ activities can be seen by other passengers and 
because all purchases on the entertainment system are recorded with a time stamp. The results 
show that the purchase probability for a media item increases, on average, by 30% if a lateral 
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neighbor (i.e., a neighbor next to the passenger in the same row) makes a purchase. The patterns 
that are revealed in the analyses cannot be sufficiently explained by classical social influence 
theories. For example, the author finds cross-category effects, which means that a purchase by a 
consumer in one category might have a negative influence on the neighbor’s purchase probability 
in a different category. We would expect rational consumers not to be influenced by the 
purchases of their neighbors at all. Thus, it can be assumed that the participants in this study were 
acting irrationally, as their purchase probability increased through social effects.  
Finally, we discuss another example of social contagion, but this one occurs in a conventional 
retail context. Argo, Dahl, and Morales (2008) analyze how social influence in the context of 
touching and contamination of products by attractive consumers can impact other consumers. 
Physical touch in a retail setting is a paradox. On the one hand, touch helps consumers to inform 
themselves about the product and to make better purchase decisions. On the other hand, they 
dislike others touching the products they want to buy, as they feel that this contaminates the 
products. However, using experiments, this study shows that there are certain conditions under 
which the touch of others can have positive outcomes, so-called positive consumer contagion. 
The authors show that consumers prefer products that have been previously touched by highly 
attractive others. For example, when male consumers believed that a highly attractive female had 
touched a product (i.e., had tried on a piece of apparel), their product evaluations improved. 
However, the same was not true for female consumers when other attractive females had touched 
the product. As the second experiment shows, the effect of attractiveness level on consumer 
contagion outcomes is moderated by sex. Thus, positive contagion outcomes were only realized 
when the opposite sex performed the touch. As in the previous example, it can be assumed that 
consumers act irrationally in this context, as their product evaluations should not be influenced by 
the previous touch of other individuals. As the products are not diminished in terms of quality or 
in any other way that would reduce their value, it is not rational to adapt product evaluations 
simply based on the occurrence of touch by other individuals.  
3.4. Promotion 
3.4.1. Promotion & Non-Standard Preferences 
Consumers often employ self-control to avoid hedonic temptations. However, consumers 
sometimes force themselves to indulge. Kivetz and Simonson (2002) study self-control in 
sweepstakes and lotteries – a popular example of “true” nonprice promotions (Gedenk, Neslin, 
29 
and Ailawadi 2006). Consumers still pay the full price for a good or a service, but they also 
obtain the opportunity to win something. Kivetz and Simonson (2002) show, in an experiment 
with a between-subjects design and real choices, that the likelihood of pre-committing to 
indulgence (i.e., the choice of a hedonic luxury over cash) is enhanced when the consequences of 
the decision will be realized farther in the future. In particular, female respondents have a higher 
preference for a hedonic prize with a value of $80 (described as “a luxurious one-hour facial 
cosmetic treatment or a one-hour pampering massage”) over $85 in cash if the lottery drawing 
takes place in 14 weeks compared to 1 week. Hence, time-preferences are inconsistent and cannot 
be explained using the standard model because the preference order should not change given 
different time horizons. In the case of the longer time delay, Kivetz and Simonson (2002) explain 
this effect with lower concreteness and psychological costs. An additional interesting finding, 
which is also inconsistent with the standard model, is that some respondents choose the hedonic 
luxury ($80) over the cash prize with a higher value ($85). A rational decision-maker would 
always pick the cash prize and then purchase the specific hedonic luxury with a positive residual 
amount (given that the willingness to pay is high enough). 
Regarding reference dependence, Kivetz (2003) relates the utility function of prospect theory to 
the (risky) choice of rewards in the context of frequency (or loyalty) programs. By manipulating 
whether effort is required to be eligible for the reward, Kivetz (2003) shows that the presence of 
effort shifts the reference point such that consumers require some form of definite compensation 
and prefer a sure-small reward (1,000 miles in a frequent-flyer program) vs. a larger-uncertain 
(risky) reward (1/50 chance to win 50,000 miles). Additionally, the author shows that intrinsic 
motivation acts as a moderator in this relationship and attenuates the effect of effort on risk 
preferences. Kalra and Shi (2010), on the other hand, use cumulative prospect theory, modeling 
the reference dependence of the value function, loss aversion, and non-linear probability 
weighting, to find a value-maximizing optimal reward structure for sweepstakes. The reference 
dependent value function, in particular, allows distinguishing the behavior of different types 
(high-brand- and low-brand-valuation) of consumers. For the latter, the reference point will be 
higher, as those consumers require compensation for switching costs. Kalra and Shi (2010) 
empirically validated their hypotheses that the value-maximizing reward structure of the 
sweepstake will depend on the type of consumer and their risk-aversion or risk-neutrality in gain 
domains. In particular, they show that high-brand-valuation risk-neutral consumers have a greater 
likelihood of choosing “winner-takes-all grand prize only” types of sweepstakes, while risk-
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averse consumers prefer sweepstakes with more than one prize. In contrast, low-brand-valuation 
consumers prefer sweepstakes of one grand or multiple larger prizes bundled with many small 
prizes. Because the utility in the standard model depends on the overall wealth level, the observed 
shifts in risk preferences in both Kivetz (2003) and Kalra and Shi (2010) cannot be explained by 
effort and switching costs. 
In the case of campaigns for donations, social preferences are important in the context of 
advertising. Sudhir, Roy, and Cherian (2016) run a large-scale field experiment with 
approximately 185,000 prospective new donors and investigate how the content and framing of 
information in mail advertisements affects donation choices and amounts for a specific program 
in India (“Support a Gran,” which supports elderly destitute women). Note that under the 
standard model, no reaction to the advertisements should be expected. The authors have 12 
experimental treatments (plus a control group) with four factors: (1) whether the victim is 
identified or not, (2) whether the victim belongs to the same religion as the donor (Hindu or 
Christian), (3) whether the situation of the victim is described as a loss or not, and (4) whether the 
yearly donation is framed as a daily or monthly amount. Whereas the last factor is a clear framing 
effect, the first three factors are closely related to nonstandard preferences. Sudhir, Roy, and 
Cherian (2016) hypothesize that evoking sympathy leads to prosocial behavior and “more giving” 
because of a reference-dependent sympathy bias. Although the donation rate is quite low in 
general (approximately 0.2%), the results show that all four factors indeed have positive and 
significant main effects, leading to a higher probability of donation and (conditional on donation) 
higher donation amounts. Hence, this empirical evidence is interesting because it shows not only 
that social preferences exist (i.e., donation rate > 0%) but also that simple communicative 
elements of an advertisement can moderate the results because of reference dependence and 
framing. Another study related to social preferences, that of Dubé, Luo, and Fang (2017), 
investigates prosocial behavior in the context of direct marketing and specifically the interplay of 
discounts (price-promotions) and donations as nonprice-promotions. In a large-scale field 
experiment, the authors manipulate the discounts and donation levels of SMS coupons for a 
movie and send the coupons to the mobile phones of subscribers who live close to a theater. The 
experiment reveals several interesting effects: (1) When there is no price discount, redemption 
rates are positive if the amount of the donation is greater than zero, i.e., social preferences exist. 
(2) If donations are zero, the redemption rates strictly increase in discount depth, which is 
consistent with standard economic theory. (3) However, if both promotional instruments 
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(discounts and donations) are combined, the results are mixed. High donations do not work well 
together with deep discounts, implying a negative interaction effect. Dubé, Luo, and Fang (2017) 
explain these results with a self-signaling effect: consumers update their own beliefs about 
themselves, and price discounts crowd out the self-inference of altruism (Benabou and Tirole 
2006). 
Lim and Chen (2014) investigate the role of social preferences in sales force incentives, which 
subsequently lead to better face-to-face communication with the customer. As rational agents 
only include their own payoffs in the utility, following the standard model assumptions – i.e., 
individual incentives for the sales force personnel – should be most efficient. In contrast, Lim and 
Chen (2014) find that in certain situations, e.g., in the case of strong social ties among the (two) 
group members, group incentives can be more effective. Notably, this is the case if the payment 
scheme puts less focus on the contribution of each teammate and if group members cannot 
accurately observe the amount of effort of other group members. Lim and Chen (2014) further 
show that a behavioral model with the utility function, including the payoffs of the group 
members, better predicts the observed dynamics compared with the standard model. 
3.4.2. Promotion & Non-standard Beliefs 
Concerning non-standard beliefs, optimism biases might lead to higher efficiency of a 
promotional instrument that has an element of uncertainty, such as sweepstakes or delayed 
promotion (e.g., mail-in rebates). For example, Goldsmith and Amir (2010) provide experimental 
and field evidence that sweepstakes, which offer an unknown probability of receiving a more 
valued or inferior product (with a not-too-large value variance), can have comparable efficiency 
(in terms of purchase likelihood) to that of sweepstakes with a certain reward of only the valued 
product and are more efficient than sweepstakes that offer the inferior product as a reward. The 
authors suggest, and show through an experiment, that this advantage is due to consumers acting 
as if they expect to receive the best possible outcome, i.e., they are overoptimistic about their 
chances. Further, overconfidence might come into play in the context of delayed promotions 
(e.g., mail-in rebates), resulting in redemption “slippage” (failure to redeem). In particular, 
Soman (1998) finds that, while keeping the face value of the discount of the mail-in rebate 
constant, the amount of effort does not affect the purchase likelihood when there is a delay 
between purchase and redemption. At the same time, the purchase likelihood of the promoted 
brand is higher when there is such a delay. The author suggests that this behavior can be 
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explained by overconfident consumers who underestimate the amount of effort required. 
Therefore, a mail-in rebate that is potentially unappealing to a rational decision-maker might 
seem appealing to the (irrational) overconfident consumer. Gourville and Soman (2011) further 
suggest that the strength of one’s intrinsic motivation acts as a moderator of this relationship.  
Narayanan and Manchanda (2012) study the casino gambling behavior of individuals using real 
behavioral data (revealed preferences) from a leading casino company in the US. The authors 
focus on gambling addictions as well as belief-based biases, such as the gambler’s fallacy and the 
hot hand myth. Such biases can be empirically identified because the data has a panel structure, 
where each consumer decision (playing and the amount of the bet) is observed multiple times. In 
addition to demographic variables, the data also include the marketing activities of the casino 
company that can be related to the customers’ gambling behavior. These targeted promotional 
efforts (so-called “comps”) aim at increasing the duration of play and the amount bet once a 
consumer has begun to play; and they are set based on the past behavior of the player. Narayanan 
and Manchanda (2012) find a negative (positive) effect of last wins (losses) on current betting 
behavior, which is consistent with the gambler’s fallacy (i.e., based on the standard model, the 
past results of a random event should not have an effect on current behavior). Furthermore, males 
and Hispanics display stronger evidence of the gambler’s fallacy. The casino’s marketing 
activities have a positive effect on the probability of playing and the amount bet. Comparing the 
elasticities of effects, it can be shown that the elasticity of last losses is approximately the same 
as the elasticity of comps, implying that the effect of the gambler’s fallacy is equivalent to the 
effect of targeted marketing in the casino industry. Also note that comps have an intertemporal 
effect because of the gambler’s fallacy. 
3.4.3. Promotion & Non-Standard Decision-Making 
Keeping the face value of the discount offered by the promotion constant, Cheema and Patrick 
(2008) provide evidence, from both hypothetical and field experiments, that framing the time 
window as expansive (anytime) vs. restrictive (only) affects the evaluation of the promotion by 
consumers and interacts with their mind-set (deliberative vs. implemental). In particular, while 
the time window is the same in the experimental conditions, the way it is communicated differs: 
either the redemption is possible any time between 12:00 and 4:00 pm (expansive frame) or only 
between 12:00 and 4:00 pm (restrictive frame). The results suggest that respondents with an 
implemental mind-set, who focus on the feasibility of the offer, prefer and have higher 
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redemption rates for the expansively framed promotions, while the opposite is true for 
respondents with a deliberative mind-set, who evaluate the offer on a more abstract level. Note 
that under standard rationality assumptions, there should be no difference in the redemption rates 
because there is no difference in the time frames.  
Chakravarti and Xie (2006) also provide evidence of framing effects in the context of advertising 
by comparing the efficiency of comparative (direct and indirect) and non-comparative advertising 
in markets with competing technological standards. In such markets, the purchase decision is, in 
fact, more complex due to the higher uncertainty regarding which standard will prevail and the 
potential costs related to ending up with the standard that eventually loses. The authors provide 
empirical evidence that in the case of standard competition, comparative advertising, which 
communicates relative vs. absolute information, results in a higher choice likelihood of the 
advertised brand (44-69% choice share) than does non-comparative advertising (19%). At the 
same time, direct comparative advertising (in which a particular competitor brand is mentioned) 
proves to be more efficient than indirect (69% vs. 44% choice share), as it provides a specific 
reference point for consumers. The same attribute information is communicated in all three 
advertising formats; therefore, based on standard rationality assumptions, there should not be 
such discrepancy in the choice shares.  
Regarding limited attention, Zhang, Wedel, and Pieters (2009) study how the characteristics of 
feature advertisements (e.g., size, location on the page) affect sales and the mediating role of 
attention in these relationships. In particular, they match attention (eye-tracking) data (collected 
in a lab) for feature ads used by top supermarket retailers in the Netherlands with the retracted 
design characteristics of these feature ads and actual sales data from the GfK panel. Using a 
Bayesian model, which accounts for the mediating role of attention and the potential endogeneity 
of the key variables, they find that attention to feature ads, measured by gaze duration, results in 
higher sales above the effect of the mere presence of the feature ad. Further, they find support for 
the mediating effect of attention on the effects of feature characteristics on sales. One interesting 
finding is that a cluttered display page reduces the efficiency of feature advertisements and their 
ability to generate sales.  
Related to persuasion in advertising, Cowley (2006) analyzes how consumers react to wildly 
exaggerated claims for products or services. In a lab experiment, respondents saw different print 
advertisements for three different products/services (Harbor Bistro, Alternative Bar, City Cruise 
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line). The ads differ in their levels of exaggeration (fact, low puffery, high puffery). For example, 
the Harbor Bistro ad claimed that the bistro was “the very best bistro in Sydney” (low puffery), 
“the ultimate dining experience” (high puffery), or simply made the factual claim of offering 
“dining with a harbor view.” The results show that although consumers can identify exaggerated 
claims as less credible than factual claims, their brand evaluations are inflated after exposure to 
exaggerated claims. Persuasion bias can explain this outcome. In the standard model, on the other 
hand, consumers should take into account that the information provider has an incentive to “over-
sell” their product/service, and thus brand valuation should not vary across experimental 
conditions. In a similar vein, Cox and Cox (2001) analyze the persuasive effect of advertising for 
early-detection products (e.g., mammograms). In particular, they examine the effect of alternative 
approaches to communication (statistical facts vs. anecdotes) and the framing (gain/loss) of the 
consequences of early-detection behavior. The results of an experiment show that anecdotal 
messages have an interaction effect with framing: Loss-framed anecdotal advertisements have a 
higher perceived informational value and lead to a greater perceived likelihood of having a 
mammogram after seeing the ad. However, this interaction effect is not present for statistical 
information. Therefore, this study shows that advertising might lead to a persuasion bias, but only 
if the content is anecdotal and gain/loss-framed. 
4. Managerial Implications & Avenues for Future Research 
As the previous section shows, there are numerous biases that affect consumer behavior across 
marketing instruments. Understanding these behavioral effects offers marketing practitioners 
many opportunities to increase profits by designing their marketing strategies accordingly. 
Indeed, many companies are already taking advantage of their customers’ predictably irrational 
behavior. For instance, regarding product, firms are integrating consumers’ social preferences 
into their product strategy. Fair trade labels (e.g., for coffee) are a case in point; there is ample 
empirical evidence from surveys that consumers are willing to pay more for socially responsible 
products. Next, regarding price, firms benefit by framing price information. For example, 
consumers perceive tensile claims (e.g., savings of __% and more) to offer lower savings than 
other non-tensile (objective) claims (e.g., savings given as a coupon), as the low end of the price 
promotion is highlighted in tensile claims. Moreover, regarding place, firms already optimize 
their store layouts and displays (i.e., a physical form of framing) such that in-store travel distance, 
and hence unplanned spending, is increased. Finally, regarding promotion, we observe that firms 
capitalize on consumers’ presumed overconfidence. Many firms are using sweepstakes that have 
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an unknown probability of receiving a more valued or inferior product (with a not-too-large value 
variance), which have comparable efficiency (in terms of purchase likelihood) because 
consumers act as if they expect to receive the best possible outcome. 
Having presented examples of how firms already make use of their consumers’ irrational 
behavior, the question arises whether companies could benefit even more from focusing on 
behavioral effects or whether they already sufficiently incorporate such effects into their 
marketing strategies. A first point to consider is that while firms already exploit several 
opportunities that follow from non-standard preferences, beliefs, and decision-making in their 
marketing strategies, such as reference dependence or framing, there might be other biases that 
are difficult to observe (e.g., overconfidence) that firms might not have fully exploited yet. Thus, 
additional attention to underrepresented biases would offer marketing managers more 
opportunities to influence consumer behavior. 
In particular, among the three classes of deviations from the standard economic model, we find 
that much research in marketing addresses consumers’ preferences as well as their decision-
making, while much less attention has been devoted to studying their beliefs. For example, there 
is extensive research on reference-dependent preferences (e.g., reference price theory) and 
framing (especially in promotion research), while the marketing research on the impact of belief-
based biases, such as overconfidence or projection bias, is still rather scarce. With respect to the 
marketing instruments, we observe that numerous studies documenting behavioral biases in 
marketing address issues mainly related to product, price, and promotion. Studies focusing on 
place are rather scarce. One explanation for this observation is that issues around place often do 
not explicitly refer to the established terminology of behavioral economics. However, based on 
our literature search, it also appears that fewer studies are analyzing place. 
In addition to the implications we draw from our review, current and future developments will 
influence firms’ understanding of behavioral biases and the ways in which firms can influence 
consumer behavior. First, the boundaries between online and offline shopping are increasingly 
blurring (Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Rahman 2013). The ability to track (potential) buyers across 
channels allows sellers to draw a much more holistic picture of their customers. As a 
consequence, firms can develop much more sophisticated and targeted methods that account for 
behavioral biases and use these to influence consumer behavior. For example, firms could target 
consumers at times where they are most resource-depleted or when they are in close proximity to 
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stores to increase unplanned buying. In terms of product offerings, the study of the endowment 
effect for different touch interfaces showed how important it is that firms create their websites in 
a mobile-friendly way so that consumers are affected by the endowment effect via the 
combination of touch and product visualizations, in almost the same way as they are affected in 
physical stores. Relatedly, online channels enable firms to exploit context and framing effects 
with less effort because websites can be easily adapted and changed for each customer, and 
native advertising in mobile search can lead to persuasion. Context effects are of particular 
interest for new online services, such as music and movie streaming services or offline/online 
channels for publishing journals. Firms need to understand how behavioral biases work given that 
many new products and services, which are sold on- and offline, are increasingly complex and 
difficult for consumers to evaluate. 
Second, the emergence and increasing interaction of consumers with new technologies have the 
potential to moderate behavioral biases. Marketing managers need to react to these developments 
but can also actively employ these technologies to track and influence consumer behavior. While 
some digital offers are already likely to affect the way behavioral biases are playing out today, 
other technologies are still in an early stage of development but are likely to affect behavior in the 
near future. For instance, with the help of technologies such as RFID or Bluetooth Beacons, 
consumer behavior can be tracked and immediate action can be taken to influence the in-store 
behavior of consumers. Using these technologies, retailers can offer mobile coupons based on the 
in-store location of their customers or current products in the customer’s shopping basket, both of 
which can increase the path traveled in-store to expose consumers to more in-store stimuli that 
may lead to more unplanned buying. In addition, video screens with real-time messages and 
electronic shelves can be used to interact with customers and potentially influence their behavior 
(Dukes and Liu 2010). 
Amazon’s delivery service “Prime Now” is another example. “Prime Now” offers delivery within 
the next (couple of) hour(s). Thus, consumers are not restricted to shopping hours and do not 
have to wait for deliveries for (at best) one day; instead, they can immediately satisfy their needs, 
which is very likely to induce consumers to engage in more impulse buying.  
Yet another example is augmented reality – a technology that already exists but is not yet used to 
its fullest potential. Using augmented reality in online shopping can help consumers imagine 
items such as furniture in their actual apartments, which could influence behavior via biases such 
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as the endowment effect. Finally, in the foreseeable future, additional distribution channels will 
develop, for which consumers’ behavior needs to be assessed. For example, cars may potentially 
develop into a new channel, as autonomous driving will allow new activities to be performed 
inside the car while traveling. 
Third, the increasing share of digitally mediated sales enables sellers to collect massive amounts 
of high-quality data (i.e., disaggregated across individuals and time) about their customers’ 
behavior and to track direct responses to their marketing measures. These data enable firms to 
better understand their customers, to detect their behavioral biases and to eventually capitalize on 
them. Digital markets may also give rise to new behavioral biases because most of the “classical” 
biases were first discovered and studied long before the age of the Internet. For example, research 
suggests that consumers are developing lower rates of information recall because Google offers 
an external memory (Sparrow, Liu, and Wegner 2011). 
The interplay of online-offline convergence, new technologies, and data allows marketing 
managers to individualize the targeting of (potential) customers. Marketing managers are able to 
offer personalized products, to engage in personalized pricing (e.g., dynamic pricing), to 
customize digital interfaces (e.g., adaptive websites) and to individually communicate promotions 
to their customers. As a result, firms can learn about the heterogeneity of behavioral biases in 
their customer bases and can adapt their marketing mix on the customer’s level accordingly. 
However, as much as firms may benefit from exploiting behavioral biases, such a strategy may 
also backfire. First, consumers may become aware of firms’ practices and turn away from a brand 
if they feel outsmarted. In addition, regulators and consumer protection agencies are likely to 
interfere if firms are unwilling to commit to staying within reasonable boundaries. Therefore, to 
prevent being externally regulated, marketers should consider setting internal boundaries within 
which they want to conduct business. 
Avenues for future research can be divided into methodological issues and research questions. 
First, in terms of methodology, the increased use of online and mobile channels offers researchers 
the possibility to more easily obtain detailed field data and to conduct field experiments, 
particularly in marketing (Lambrecht and Tucker 2015). Researchers should use these methods to 
replicate and to extend behavioral effects in the marketing literature. Regarding field 
experiments, it would be interesting to study behavioral biases with real consumers instead of 
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convenience samples, such as student samples. Furthermore, field experiments across multiple 
countries, industries, and domains are of particular interest to enhance the generalizability of such 
studies because specific behavioral biases are most likely heterogeneous along these dimensions. 
Also related to methodological aspects are structural models and advances in experimental 
designs that explicitly allow for behavioral biases (see e.g., Dubé, Hitsch, and Jindal 2014). Such 
efforts would also be highly valuable for future research. 
Second, with regard to unexplored research questions, our review of papers dealing with non-
standard preferences, beliefs, and decision-making in the marketing literature indicates that some 
biases are not as thoroughly addressed as others. Specifically, belief-based biases such as 
overconfidence are not addressed as often as other biases. Yet, this class of deviations from the 
standard economic model has been shown to be important in other business disciplines such as 
finance (e.g., Glaser, Nöth, and Weber 2004). Therefore, belief-based biases merit future research 
in the marketing domain. Likewise, looking at the elements of the marketing mix, existing 
research focuses more on product, price, and promotion than on place. In the face of the 
developments and technological advancements discussed above, the convergence of the online 
and offline channels, as well as behavioral biases related to place, appear to be particularly 
promising areas for future research. Emerging technologies such as augmented reality are likely 
to have an effect on existing behavioral biases, and in addition, might cause new forms of 
irrational behavior. More generally, the existence and persistence of biases across all elements of 
the marketing mix need to be re-evaluated in light of new technologies. 
Additionally, questions concerning the existence of biases in competitive environments are 
currently neglected. Neoclassical economists often claim that behavioral biases must be irrelevant 
because they cannot survive in competitive markets. However, behavioral economists argue that 
some biases may not only survive competition but may even be reinforced by it. And because 
most markets are competitive, we believe that the behavioral biases discussed in the marketing 
literature also persist. Nevertheless, we do not yet know much about the actual consequences of 




In this paper, we aimed to bring together research from behavioral economics and marketing. We 
reviewed previous marketing research documenting behavior that deviates from neoclassical 
predictions and mapped the findings onto a structure that involves elements from both economics 
and marketing. In this way, we provide examples of each group of biases (i.e., non-standard 
preferences, non-standard beliefs, and non-standard decision-making) from empirical marketing 
research, from both the field and the lab. From these examples, we derive implications for 
marketing research and practice.  
This paper caters to marketing researchers and behavioral economists alike. We contribute to the 
respective research domains by introducing marketing researchers to the terminology employed 
in the field of behavioral economics and thereby help them to better navigate the extensive list of 
documented biases in this field. As for the field of behavioral economics, we provide scholars 
with easy access to the rich marketing literature containing applied empirical research. More 
generally, researchers may benefit from this review by pursuing the proposed avenues for future 
research. Likewise, marketers and practitioners can benefit from the derived implications.  
The combination of economics and psychology is not only what is known as behavioral 
economics, economics and psychology are also the two most influential disciplines underlying 
marketing (Ho, Lim, and Camerer 2006). Therefore, many studies from marketing research 
explicitly draw on theories and models of behavioral economics or are concerned with research 
questions that could be analyzed through the lens of behavioral economics, although this is not 
always particularly apparent. We illustrate this by mapping and discussing papers from marketing 
research that study behavioral biases onto a combined structure from behavioral economics (i.e., 
DellaVigna 2009) and marketing (the four marketing instruments). We find that for product, 
price, and promotion, the connection to behavioral economics is often very explicit, while the 
commonalities regarding place are much less salient. As for the three classes of deviations from 
the standard economic model (i.e., non-standard preferences, beliefs, and decision-making), we 
find that much research in marketing addresses consumers’ preferences as well as their decision-
making, while much less attention has been devoted to studying their beliefs. 
Regarding managerial implications, we observe several similarities across all marketing 
instruments. First, it can be established that many firms are aware and already take advantage of 
many of the behavioral biases discussed in this paper. However, current and future developments 
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will influence the firms’ understanding of behavioral biases and the way in which firms can 
influence consumer behavior. The boundaries between online and offline shopping are 
increasingly blurring, enabling firms to track their (potential) buyers across channels and thus to 
draw a much more holistic picture of their behavior. Consequently, firms seeking to influence 
consumer behavior can develop much more sophisticated and targeted methods that account for 
behavioral biases. 
Moreover, digital technologies are driving new developments that affect consumer behavior. 
Firms will need to assess how behavioral biases change in the face of these new developments 
and how the marketing mix needs to be adapted accordingly. We find examples across all 
marketing instruments: from new products and services emerging through digital technologies, to 
increasingly prevalent forms of pricing such as dynamic pricing, to changes in distribution due to 
the increased use of online channels and non-stationary devices such as mobile phones, to a shift 
in communication from traditional marketing channels such as TV to digital channels. An 
advantage of the increasing share of digitally mediated sales is that it enables sellers to collect 
massive amounts of high-quality data about their customers’ behavior, which lets them track 
direct response to their marketing measures. 
Taken together, the interplay of online-offline convergence, new technologies, and data allows 
marketing managers to individualize the targeting of (potential) customers. Consequently, firms 
can learn about the heterogeneity of behavioral biases in their customer base and can adapt their 
marketing mix to the customer’s level accordingly. 
Avenues for future research can be found both for methodological issues and research questions. 
In terms of methodology, the increased use of online and mobile channels offers researchers the 
opportunity to obtain detailed field data more easily and to conduct field experiments. With 
regard to unexplored research questions, belief-based biases such as overconfidence are not 
addressed as often as other biases and thereby merit future research. Likewise, looking at the 
instruments of the marketing mix, place is relatively unexplored. In the face of the developments 
and technological advancements discussed above, particularly the convergence of the online and 
offline channels, behavioral biases related to place appear to be a promising area for future 
research. Furthermore, emerging technologies such as augmented reality are likely to have an 
effect on existing behavioral biases and, in addition, might cause new forms of irrational 
behavior. Additionally, questions concerning the existence of biases in competitive environments 
41 
are currently neglected, leaving room for studying behavioral biases in the context of competitive 
environments. 
We must also acknowledge some limitations. Because we focus on prime examples of the 
different “bias – marketing instrument” combinations, this review does not present a complete 
overview of the behavioral biases studied in marketing. Consequently, we cannot quantitatively 
determine the relative importance of the different biases for the four marketing instruments but 
can only provide a qualitative assessment of this relationship. Nevertheless, we believe that this 
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